The following sections raise seven doubts to the truth of these claimsespecially if applied to Logical Form in English -and argue that the approach of Beall and Restall misses are clear methodology. §1
The Common Core Problem
Pluralism is said by Beall and Restall to be different from relativism. But there is a problem with logical pluralism similar to the difficulties of claiming relativism to be true. Logical Pluralism is put forth as a claim that is true. All those who are not immediately convinced of the claim by merely understanding it have to be convinced by arguments. These arguments have to be valid, correct and convincing in some sense. What sense is that? It supposedly has to be a sense of convincing valid argument that can be directed at any audience whatsoever. Thus it seems to use the common core of accepted argumentative standards, whatever other logical preferences the different audiences may have. Thus it seems to be the intersection of different (applied) systems of reasoning. That would be some kind of common core logic. There would be nothing pluralistic about this common core (on pains of sliding into logical relativism, which was to be kept apart from pluralism). So the common core arguments would be valid by any standards. Thus logical pluralism taken as the claim that there is no universal common core of logic would be violated. And if the common core is not strong enough it does not deliver the arguments needed to convince everybody of logical pluralism.
A strange dilemma for the logical pluralist, it seems.
So our first claim is: In presenting a general argument for pluralism Beall and Restall seem to presuppose the very universal core of logic the existence of which they reject.
2

The Formal Common Core Problem
Further on, logical pluralism is formulated in some language. This language has to be well-defined to make logical pluralism a well-defined, non-vague thesis. Logical pluralism has to be true (simpliciter). The theory language of logical pluralism used as a meta-language when talking about the different ways to spell out being logical has a logical form. Whatever else may be vague in a language, a sentence has at a given level of specification (say Categorical Grammar vs. Propositional
Temporal Logic) one and only one most articulate logical form. Even in case a surface structure has more than one derivation, and thus is related to more than one logical form, the logical forms themselves do not leave the logical structure unspecified and algorithmic procedures relate a surface structure to a logical form. which the premises are true, so is the conclusion. (29) Open for a pluralistic treatment, according to Restall and Beall, whether the system thus employed in formalizing ordinary language arguments is adequate (cf. also Åqvist 1987, pp. 24-41) . Given the criteria (i) and (ii) of correctness and completeness no two distinct logics can be both adequate. Or, two distinct logics can only be both adequate if our ordinary concept of logical consequence is undecided on the matters involved. This, however, as an empirical claim has to be established empirically. As in other fields of logical reconstruction in the cognitive sciences where one aims for a wide reflective equilibrium between our intuitive judgements, rule systems to reconstruct our intuitive reasoning, and further knowledge about our cognitive architecture (cf. Stein 1996) one would have to sample a lot of evaluations of different supposed [LF] structure must be articulated so that both logical structure -that needed to explicate the direct role of the syncategoremic logical terms -and compositional structure -that needed to explicate the indirect role of the categoremic non-logical terms -is represented. (May 1993, p. 336) .
There is overwhelming empirical evidence for this level of structured descriptions (cf. Chomsky 1995) . 
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to put forth questions to the logical pluralists. The seven claims directed as criticism at Beall and Restall may find some (partial) answers by them (or their allies). So it may be too early to rush to a conclusion. On the other hand, it seems that the case for logical pluralism is far from clear. This pertains especially to the methodology of the logical pluralists. It is even unclear what exactly logical pluralism is and where is stops. It is even unclear if logical pluralism could be stated as it is if it was true. So far universalism seems to be the better position to take.
